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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Nature of the Case.
The Defendants/Respondents, Russell G. Griffeth, dba Teton Physical Therapy,
P.A., Employer, and Idaho State Insurance Fund, Surety (hereinafter collectively "Griffeth"),
agrees with the Nature of the Case set forth in Appellant's Brief.

The Course of Proceedings.
Griffeth agrees with the Course of Proceedings set forth in Appellant's Brief with
the following addition: William Bryan Robinson, dba Highmark Construction, Employer,
(hereinafter "Robinson"), has not filed an appeal or cross appeal to the decision rendered by the
Industrial Commission in this claim. The Claimant/Appellant, Geffary Stringer (hereinafter
"Stringer"), was found by the Industrial Commission to be the direct employee of Robinson at
the time of the September 4, 2009 accident

Statement of Facts.
Griffeth agrees with the Statement of Facts set forth in the "Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order" authored by the Industrial Commission. (R. pp. 17-25). As a
supplement to those factual findings, Griffeth adds the following:
1. By September 4, 2009, the date of the accident, Stringer had been on the Teton
Physical Therapy job for approximately "eight-and-a-half, nine days." September 4, 2004, was to
be his last day on the job. (Tr. p. 96, LL. 6-13).
2. Stringer had no expectation of continuing employment with Robinson or
Griffeth. (Tr. pp. 96-97, LL. 21-25, 1-12).
1

3. Stringer understood the work he was doing at Teton Physical Therapy to be
temporary in nature, a "one-time, one-shot thing." Griffeth did not talk to him about doing any
other remodeling-type work, nor did he have any other work for Stringer. (Tr. pp. 97-98, LL. 1025, 7-19). The project was for a single purpose, limited in scope and duration. (Tr. p. 170, LL.
2-18; Tr. p. 100, LL. 11-17).
4. Griffeth testified his total construction experience consisted of working for two
months when he was fifteen years old for an electrician. He did not, in any way, consider himself
a general contractor, nor did he have the training, skills or experience necessary to do
construction work. (Tr. pp. 128-129, LL. 1-25, 1).
5. Griffeth was trained and educated as a physical therapist. Physical Therapy
was his sole vocation. Construction work was not any part of his physical therapy business. (Tr.
pp. 170-171, LL. 22-25, 1-5; Tr. p. 122, LL. 11-18; Tr. p. 100, LL. 18-24).
6. Stringer admitted he was aware Russell's physical therapy work had no
involvement with construction work and he was there only for a temporary purpose, to remodel
Griffeth' s office. (Tr. pp. 98-99, LL. 17-25, 1-13).
7. Although Griffeth did make suggestions and comments while the work was in
progress, seeking a particular result in the work, he did not provide day-to-day supervision. He
did not have the technical expertise to know whether the workers were doing it right, since it was
not part of his chosen vocation. (Tr. pp. 142-143, LL. 13-25, 1-16; p. 147, LL. 3-10; p. 169, LL.
11-20).
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8. Griffeth did not foresee the need to do this type of project on his building more
than one time. The need for such a project was not likely to reoccur in the foreseeable future.
(Tr. p. 170, LL. 2-12).
9. Both Robinson and Stringer also understood the Teton Physical Therapy
project was a one-time construction job without the possibility of having any further work from
Griffeth on the Teton Physical Therapy building. They had no expectation of continuing
employment beyond the completion date of the project. They understood the employment for
Griffeth was temporary and limited in nature. They also acknowledged that no part of the
physical therapy work of Griffeth involved construction work. It was simply not part of his
business. (Tr. pp. 242-245, LL. 21-25, 1-25, 1-25, 1-2; pp. 98-100, LL. 7-25, 1-25, 11-24).
10. Both Stringer and Robinson believed Stringer was working for Griffeth while
doing the attic job at which he was injured. (Tr. p. 91, LL. 19-22; Tr. p. 239, LL. 7-11).
11. Griffeth believed Stringer was working for Robinson during the entire
project. (Tr. pp. 158-159, LL. 10-19, 7-18).

3

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Was Stringer's employment casual in nature and, therefore, exempt from worker's
compensation coverage under Idaho Code §72-212(2), regardless of whether Griffeth was a
direct employer or a category 1 statutory employer?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission is limited to a review of
questions of law. (Idaho Constitution Art. V, §9).
"When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court views all the facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the Industrial
Commission." Neihart v. Universal Joint Auto Parts, Inc., 141 Idaho 801, 802, 118 P.3d 133,
135 (2005) citing Luttrell v. Clearwater County Sherif.f's Office, 140 Idaho 581, 583, 97 P.3d
448, 450 (2004). "The Commission's factual findings are subject to a clear error standard, and
wil1 be upheld if supported by competent and substantial evidence construed most favorably to
the party who prevailed below." Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870
P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). The findings of fact of the Industrial Commission should be set aside
only if the record is "devoid of substantial competent evidence to support them." Paulson v.
Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 900, 591 P.2d 143, 147 (1979; Idaho Code §72732(1). On appeal, the Court does not "weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have
reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented." Gooby v. Lake Shore lv!anagement
Co., 136 Idaho 79, 82, 29 P.3d 390, 393 (2001). The Industrial Commission's conclusions
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regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the conclusions are
clearly erroneous. Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 515, 975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999).
"The Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of the worker when evidence
is conflicting." Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 361, 363, 834 P.2d 878, 880 (1992).

ARGUMENT
I. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER GRIFFETH WAS A DIRECT EMPLOYER
OR A "CATEGORY 1 STATUTORY EMPLOYER" CLAIMANT'S EMPLOYMENT
WITH GRIFFETH WAS CASUAL IN NATURE AND THEREFORE EXEMPT FROM
WORKER'S COMPENSATION COVERAGE.
A. The Definition of Casual Employment.
Idaho Code §72-212(1) states:

None of the provisions of this law shall apply to the following employments
unless coverage thereof is elected as provided in Section 72-213, Idaho Code

...

( )

(2) Casual Employment. 1
Casual employment is not defined by statute and therefore its definition and parameters
must be derived from case law. In Larson v. Bonneville Pacific Services, Co., 117 Idaho 988,
989-990, 793 P.2d 220, 221-222 (1990), the Supreme Court reconfirmed the definition the Court
had used over many years:

This Court has defined 'casual employment' as employment that is only
occasional, or comes at uncertain times, or at irregular intervals, and whose
happening cannot be reasonably anticipated as certain or likely to occur or
become necessary. It is employment that arises only occasionally or
incidentally and is not part of the usual trade or business of the employer.

1

There is no evidence Griffeth elected coverage under Section 72-213, Idaho Code.
5

It is the nature of the employment that is at issue, not whether the employee was a "casual

employee." In Orr v. Boise Cold Storage Co., 52 Idaho 151, 152, 12 P.2d 270, 271 (1932), the
Court explained this principle:

In Flynn v. Carson, 42 Idaho 141, 243 P. 818, 820, this court construed this
section and held that it had reference to the employment and not to the
person employed, saying: 'The exclusion is of the 'casual employment', not
necessarily the casual 'employee'; not those 'persons' but those
'employments' are necessarily excluded, which are 'casual'.
B. The nature of Stringer's employment on the construction project at Teton
Physical Therapy meets the definition of "casual employment."
1. Was the employment "occasional"?
The building project at Teton Physical Therapy was to be an addition to and a partial
remodel of an existing building where Griffeth was conducting his physical therapy business.
Once the project was completed, it would be a permanent addition to the building which would
last indefinitely. The need for this type of project would be so infrequent that it might not even
rise to the level of being "occasional," since it was a one-time construction job. (Tr. p. 123, LL.
8-25; p. 270, LL.2-24).

2. Would the employment come at "uncertain times"?
The construction of an addition to a building or the remodeling of a building is
discretionary in nature and would come about only when the owner of the building decides to
undertake such a project. The determination of when such a project would be undertaken is
uncertain and unpredictable. (Tr. p. 170, LL. 2-24 ).

3. Would the need for such employment come at "irregular
intervals"?
6

Unlike cleaning or janitorial services, there is no anticipated interval in which new
construction or remodeling could be anticipated. All of the parties understood that the Teton
Physical Therapy building addition would be a one-time project, at best, with no anticipation of
continuing employment. (Tr. p. 170, LL. 2-24; pp. 96-100, all lines; pp. 242-244, LL. 21-25; 125, 1-17).
4. Could the happening (building project) be reasonably anticipated
as likely to occur again?
No one could anticipate or predict when another remodel or addition would need to be
made to the Teton Physical Therapy building, since this type of project, once completed, would
be considered permanent in nature. No one would attempt to schedule such a future event.
Certainly such a project would not be considered necessary or foreseeable at a particular future
time and, in fact, might never be attempted again. (Tr. p. 243, LL. 15-18; p. 170, LL. 2-12).
5. Was the employment part of the usual trade or business of the
employer?
There is no dispute Griffeth is a physical therapist and treats physical therapy patients in
the building where the addition was to be built. Griffeth was pursuing the project in order to
expand the area for his business, however, the construction of the addition was not part of his
usual trade or business. The nature of his business (physical therapy) was entirely different from
doing construction work. Construction work was not an expected, routine or inherent part of
carrying on his physical therapy work.
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Certainly, there was no evidence Griffeth hired regular employees to do the same kind of
work as Stringer and Robinson. This was not the type of work incorporated in the normal
operation of his business.
As admitted by both Stringer and Robinson, the nature of their employment was limited
or temporary in purpose and scope and was not part of Griffeth' s buiness as a physical therapist.
(Tr. pp. 98-100, all lines).
Stringer's employment was limited in duration and for a specific single purpose. The job
only lasted eight or nine days with the last three days working on the attic. The sole purpose of
employing Robinson and Stringer was to build the addition on to the physical therapy building
and nothing else. The construction of the addition was not directly related to, nor in any way
essential, to taking care of physical therapy patients. Griffeth provided worker's compensation
coverage only for his regular employees who were essential to his business practice. (Tr. p. 96,
LL. 4-13; pp. 97-100, LL. 13-24, 17-25, 1-20, 11-24; p. 170, LL. 2-20).
Although the test used by the Industrial Commission in determining whether or not
Stringer was an independent contractor is not the same test for the "casual employment"
exemption, some of the elements of that test lend themselves to supporting the Commission's
finding that the nature of Stringer's employment with Griffeth was casual in nature. The
Industrial Commission found Griffeth did not control Stringer's time, manner and methods of
working. He did not pay Stringer directly, nor make any tax withholdings. He was not hired
directly by Griffeth, nor did Griffeth supervise his work. Griffeth provided no tools or

8

equipment necessary to carry out the construction project. (R. pp. 27-28, "Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order").

C. "Casual Employment" is determined on a case-by-case basis.
Since there is no statutory definition for "casual employment," it is necessary to review
how case law has evolved and been applied to casual employment as an exemption to worker's
compensation laws. The circumstances of each claim must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

By general rule or by definition, it is difficult to completely, minutely and
adequately cover prospectively and in detail what employment may or may
not constitute casual employment, hence it is necessary, in such cases, to
decide each case upon the particular facts involved and then apply the
appropriate general rules which place the individual case within or without
the provisions of the act as it relates to casual employment.

Vogl v. Smythe, 74 Idaho 115, 119, 258 P.2d 355, 357 (1953). The Vogl Court at p. 118, 356-35
went on to adopt an earlier definition of casual employment given in Flynn v. Carson, 42 Idaho
141, 243 P. 818, 820 (1926):

The term "casual employment," in the absence of a statutory definition, has
been defined by the courts; it is a relative term and, hence, not capable of any
hard and exacting definition. In this state, the term is not defined by statute,
but it has been frequently defined by this court.
After a careful and thorough review and consideration of the Acts of various
states, as well as England, and noting the distinction in the language
employed under such various Acts for the term 'casual employment' was not
defined, this Court construed the term as employed in our statute to mean an
employment that arises occasionally or incidentally or which comes at
uncertain times or at irregular intervals for a limited or temporary purpose
and whose happening cannot be reasonably anticipated as certain or likely to
occur or become necessary or desirable and which is not a usual concomitant
of the business, trade or profession of the employer.

9

This test has been consistently followed without deviation by the Supreme Court to the
present. (Larson v. Bonneville Pacific Services Company, 117 Idaho 988, 793 P.2d 220 (1990);

Stoica v. Pocol, 136 Idaho 661, 39 P.3d 601 (2001). Since the number of cases corning to the
S uprerne Court on the issue of casual employment are limited, a review of these cases and how
the Industrial Commission and the Supreme Court have applied the facts of such cases to the
definition of casual employment may be helpful.

Construction Cases
In Orr v. Boise Cold Storage Co., 52 Idaho 151, 155, 12 P.2d 270, 271 (1932), the Boise
Cold Storage Company was engaged in the manufacture, storage, and sale of ice, and in
maintaining a commercial cold storage warehouse. Orr, a carpenter, was engaged to repair a
bulging wall that had separated from the ceiling of the storage company's building. He was
injured when another worker dropped a hammer striking Orr in the head, which ultimately
resulted in his death. The job he was doing was to have lasted approximately 10 days. Held:
"Applying such test to the facts of the instant case, the employment of Orr by the Boise Cold
Storage Company was merely incidental and occasional, without regularity, and for a limited and
temporary purpose, and was not a regular recurring employment which was customary and to be
anticipated with regularity."

Dawson v. Joe Chester Artificial Limb Co., 62 Idaho 508, 112 P .2d 4 94 ( 1941 ). Joe
Chester Artificial Limb Company was in the business of manufacture and sale of artificial limbs
and orthopedic appliances. The Company engaged carpenters to change a partition in the
building and calcimine the walls and ceiling of the building. The claimant slipped and fell from
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a scaffolding and fractured his right tibia. The employer testified he had this type of work done
when it was needed. The Industrial Commission denied compensation on the grounds the
claimant was engaged in casual employment and this was confirmed on appeal. The Court held
this type of work met the test for casual employment as given in Orr, supra.
Bigley v. Smith, 64 Idaho 185, 129 P.2d 658, 659 (1942). Bigley was engaged by Smith

to make repairs to four or five buildings which she rented to others for business purposes. Bigley
was to repair the buildings when they needed repair. His employment was not steady but
irregular, depending on when the buildings needed to be repaired. The Industrial Commission
awarded benefits, but the Supreme Court reversed, indicating Bigley's employment "was at
irregular intervals, depending on uncertain contingencies, and the amount of compensation
depended on the length of time the employee was occupied at it" and was therefore casual in
nature.
Ross v. Reynolds, 64 Idaho 87, 127 P.2d 775, 775 (1942). Reynolds was engaged by

Ross to paint a part of the interior and exterior of a business partly owned by Ross. Reynolds
was injured as the result of an explosion of a can of gasoline while on the job. The Industrial
Commission awarded benefits, but the Supreme Court reversed, indicating that Ross was not a
regular employer, had no regular payroll and hired no regular employees, but usually most of the
work was done by Ross and his wife. The Court noted that the decorating jobs on the interior of
the building "varied from two to five years intervening." The work was therefore "occasional,
incidental, and did not regularly re-occur, and the time when such work becomes necessary is not
regularly anticipated." The Court concluded the work being done was "casual employment."
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Schindler v. McFee, 69 Idaho 436, 207 P.2d 1158 (1949). Mcfee mvned five business
properties in Wallace, Idaho, all of which were rental properties and one warehouse. Mcfee
maintained the properties and hired repair work to be done. Schindler was a roofer by trade and
he was engaged in replacing a jack on the chimney of the warehouse when he fell and sustained a
serious injury. Part of Schindler' s responsibilities was to "watch" the roof and if he discovered a
necessity for repair, he would call the same to the owner's attention. Some years previously, he
had actually constructed the roof on the warehouse. Whenever he discovered something that
needed repair, he would go ahead and do the repairs without consulting Mcfee and Mcfee would
pay him for his services. The Industrial Commission awarded benefits but the Supreme Court
reversed citing the definition given in Flynn, supra, and after applying these facts, held Schindler
was engaged in casual employment at the time of the accident.

Arbogast v. Jerome Co-op. Creamery, 65 Idaho 556, 149 P.2d 230, 230 (1944). The
Creamery was a manufacturer of casein in Burley, Idaho. Arbogast was employed by his brother
to construct trays necessary for drying casein. While ripping wood to construct the trays,
claimant severely injured his hand. The Industrial Commission awarded benefits, but the
Supreme Court reversed stating:

While these trays were a necessary part of the company's equipment and
undoubtedly had to be made or purchased from time to time as they might
wear out or new equipment was needed, there was no evidence to show that it
was the regular or periodical custom of the company to employ workmen to
make these trays. It is not shown that it is essentially a part of the creamery
company's business in the manufacture of casein to employ workmen to
make these trays.
The Court then held that Arbogast's employment was casual in nature and denied the claim.
12

Wachtler v. Ca/non, 90 Idaho 468, 413 P.2d 449 (1966). Calnon, the owner of a floral

business, engaged Wachtler to paint the eaves of his floral shop building. While doing so,
Wachtler stepped through a glass roofing on a greenhouse at the rear of the building, cutting his
right arm for which he sought benefits. The Industrial Commission awarded benefits, but the
Supreme Court reversed citing Vogl, supra, and a whole litany of cases supporting its holding
that the claimant's work constituted casual employment. The claimant argued that the painting
was done for the purpose of beautification or advertising the employer's product, however, the
Court indicated the last painting was done about four years ago and the work was "occasional or
incidental" in nature.

Other Cases.

Rabideau v. Cramer, 59 Idaho 154, 81P.2d403, 405 (1938). Cramer was an attorney

who engaged Rabideau to wash his windows at intervals varying from two to six months. While
washing the windows, Rabideau fell and broke his leg. The Industrial Commission awarded
compensation, but the Supreme Court reversed holding that the window washer's employment
was "uncertain, occasional, at irregular intervals, without regularity, and for a limited and
temporary purpose."
Lail v. Bishop, 70 Idaho 284, 286, 216 P.2d 955, 956 (1950). Lail engaged Bishop to

deliver some fence pickets to a customer. Lail also had Bishop rip some more pickets to
complete an order which was done with a small portable hand saw. Bishop was injured when he
amputated the ends of his index finger and thumb while using the saw. He sought and recovered
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compensation from the Industrial Commission. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission
and held that claimant's employment, "may be in or out of the regular course of business, but the
determinative test is whether it is casual. Likewise, it is the employment and not the employee
which governs. Flynn v. Carsen, 42, Idaho 141 at page 151, 243 P. 818." The court also noted
this employment had not occurred before and it was unlikely to occur again.

Vogl v. Smythe, 74 Idaho 115, 119, 258 P.2d 355, 357 (1953). Smythe hired Vogl to
remove driftwood from a beach in front of his residence and to maintain a roadway. Smythe
owned several rental properties in the area and needed the work done to further his business. He
was injured while dragging the road. The Industrial Commission found that the dragging of the
road was for the convenience of the employer and that such employment was casual in nature and
not covered by the Workman's Compensation Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision
stating that such employment was "incidental or occasional, without regularity, for a limited and
temporary purpose, not necessarily recurring or customary or to be anticipated, with its hazard a
part of the overhead of the business."

Larson v. Bonneville Pacific Services Company, 117 Idaho 988, 793 P .2d 220 (1990).
Larson was employed by Bonneville Pacific Services to help reforest an area damaged in the
building of a hydroelectric plant. The project was to last two to three weeks. The Industrial
Commission held that claimant's employment was casual in nature and denied compensation.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision and indicated that re-vegetation was not the business of
the employer which was in the business of operating and maintaining power plants. The
reforestation project, although mandated by the government, was the type of work that arose only
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occasionally or inadvertently and was for a limited or temporary purpose. It was not anticipated
that Larson would ever be employed again by the employer. Also, the need for reforestation
would occur only at uncertain times or irregular intervals and could not be reasonably anticipated
as likely to occur or become necessary.

Employment Held Not Casual in Nature.

Cases in which the employment was not found to be casual in nature can be distinguished
from the claim at hand. In Flynn v. Carson, supra, the employer operated an auto bus line. The
claimant was killed in an accident driving one of the employer's buses. The claimant had quit
his job as a regular driver for the company but was employed regularly to drive each Saturday
night. The Court distinguished the difference between a "casual employee" and "casual
employment," stating that the first is not necessarily exempt while the latter is exempt from the
worker's compensation laws. In this case, the employment was not merely incidental nor
occasional but was regular and recurring each Saturday night. The employee could anticipate
working on those occasions and although not steadily engaged, he had an expected job he was to
perform. In the present case, there was no expectation or anticipation of ongoing regular
employment by Stringer with Griffeth. Once the short-term project ended Stringer did not
anticipate being asked to return on a weekly or any other basis to do work for Griffeth.
Fitzen v. Creamtop Dairy, 73 Idaho 210, 249 P.2d 806 (1952). Claimant was engaged in
the digging of cesspools for Cream Top Dairy. While doing so, he encountered bad air and
poisonous gas which overcame him and caused his death. The evidence showed that the
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necessity for adding cess pools came on a regular basis and was certain, reoccurring and
anticipated and therefore not casual in nature. In the case at bar, the remodeling and construction
of an addition to Teton Physical Therapy could not, under any stretch of the imagination, be
considered a certain, recurring and anticipated project which would need to be done regularly in
the future.
Stoica v. Pocol, 136 Idaho 661, 39 P.3d 601 (2001). Pocol engaged Stoica to do

remodeling and construction on property Pocol owned in the Twin Falls area. Pocol would
remodel properties and then sell or rent them on a regular basis. Stoica was injured when he fell
from a ladder while he was doing construction work on one of the properties. The Supreme
Court noted that Pocol was in the business of remodeling buildings and selling them and that
such remodeling was a regular part of his business and was therefore not casual in nature. In the
current case, Griffeth is in the business of doing physical therapy work. He was not in the
business of remodeling or adding additions to buildings for sale or rent. Obviously, constructing
an addition to his physical therapy building would enhance or further his business purposes, but
this is not the test. The test is whether the employment was a circumstance "which is not a usual
concomitant of the business, trade or profession of the employer." (Stoica, at 665).

DU/ard v. Jones, 58 Idaho 273, 72 P.2d 705 (1937). Jones was a real estate broker. He
employed Dillard to remodel a home for resale. Dillard fell from the roof breaking his leg. The
court held Dillard's work was not casual since the remodeling work on homes for rental or resale
was a regular and customary part of Jones' business.
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Partello v. Stipa, 115, Idaho 522, 768 P.2d 785 (1989) Stipa was a dog breeder who
employed Partello to feed, clean, and water her dogs. Partello was bitten by a dog and injured.
Partello's employment was found not to be casual in nature as the tasks performed by Partello
were not an incidental part of the business but were integral to it.

Dameron v. Yellowstone Trail Garage, 54 Idaho 646, 34 P .2d 417 (1934). Dameron, a
mechanic, was requested by his employer to go with other mechanics to Spokane to attend a
brake school for the purpose of teaching them how to sell a certain brake service. Dameron was
injured in a car accident while on the way to Spokane. The Court held the employment was not
casual since the employee was traveling in the car to further the employer's prospects for sale of
a product. It did not matter that the trip was not specifically for the sake of pecuniary gain.

Wise v. Arnold Transfer & Storage Company, 109 Idaho 20, 704 P .2d 352 (1985). Wise
was hired to ride in Arnold's trucks and unload those trucks. He was injured in a vehicular
accident while riding in the truck. His employer argued he was only an employee when loading
and unloading goods. However the Court held that traveling in the truck was not outside the
scope of his employment and was not casual in nature since it was an integral part of the
employer's business.

Heck v. Dow, Inc., 93 Idaho 377, 461 P.2d 717 (1969). An employee was killed in an
airplane crash while flying as a passenger with the president of the company. The purpose of the
trip was to find office space and hire personnel in another state. The Court held that this was not
casual employment since the employment was directly in the furtherance of employer's business
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purposes, even though traveling with the president of the company was not usually part of the
employee's responsibilities.

The Findings of the Industrial Commission.
The Industrial Commission made specific findings with regards to the casual nature of
Stringer's employment. The Commission found:

In the present case, had Griffeth directly hired claimant to perform work on
the addition, the evidence is clear that constructing the addition was at most
an irregular or occasional function, not a predictable or regular part of
Griffeth's physical therapy business. The addition project was an activity
which would arise only occasionally, or at uncertain times and which could
not reasonably be anticipated as certain or likely to occur in the future.
Griffeth was in the business of physical therapy at all times. Constructing
the addition to his physical therapy facility was not part of his usual trade
and not an integral part of his physical therapy business.
(R. pp. 42-43, "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order").
D. The determination by the Industrial Commission that Griffeth was a "Category
1 Statutory Employer" does not affect the employment itself as being casual in nature.
1. By law, a statutory employer is to be considered as if he were a direct employer
of the employee. Idaho Code §72-216 provides as follows:

Liability of employer to employees of contractors and subcontractors. An
employer subject to the provisions of this law shall be liable for
compensation to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor under him
who has not complied with the provisions of §72-301 [Idaho Code], in any
case where such employer would have been liable for compensation if such
employee had been working directly for such employer.
(emphasis added)
There is some dispute as to whether Stringer was working for Robinson or working
directly for Griffeth at the time he was working on the "attic job." (Tr. p.91, LL. 18-22; Tr. p.
18

239, LL. 7-11; Tr. pp. 158-159, LL. 10-19, 7-18). Stringer argues Griffeth was his statutory
employer and therefore casual employment does not apply. This is a distinction without a
difference. If Stringer had been employed directly by Griffeth, his employment would have been
exempt from worker's compensation coverage as being casual in nature. It follows that if
Griffeth was not liable as a direct employer, then he could not be liable as a statutory employer.
The statutory employer rule only applies in such cases "where such employer would have been
liable for compensation if such employee had been working directly for such employer." (Idaho
Code §72-216) Once an employment has been determined to be "casual," it is exempt from

worker's compensation coverage regardless of whether the employment is direct or statutory.
Stringer cites no cases for his proposition that casual employment should not be applied
to a circumstance involving a statutory employer. It appears his argument is the statutory
employer rule will be swallowed up by the exemption if casual employment is applied. The
statutory employer rule has been in place for decades and although there have been some
amendments, the basic principles have remained intact. (See Idaho Code §72-216 and §72223(1). Casual employment as an exemption to worker's compensation coverage has also been a
fixture in the law for an even longer period of time. The notion that somehow all statutory
employer cases will be done away has not occurred in the past or in recent decisions. Before the
exemption for casual employment can be invoked, the demanding requirements of the test for
casual employment must be met. Stringer argues that certain cases such Kolar v. Cassia County,
Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 127 P.3d 962 (2005) and Pierce v. School District No. 21, 144 Idaho 537,

164 P .3d 817 (2007) would be decided differently if casual employment had been raised as an

19

issue in those cases. Unfortunately, we will never know what would have been the outcome had
such an issue been raised in these cases, and any speculation by Stringer as to what would have
happened is mere conjecture. As previously stated, each casual employment case is to be decided
on its own merits on a case-by-case basis after applying the judicial standard followed by this
Court since at least 1926. (See Flynn v. Carson, supra).
Is there something different about a statutory employer, as opposed to a direct employer,
which would exclude casual employment as an exemption to worker's compensation coverage?
There is no question public policy encourages employers to provide worker's compensation
coverage. On the other hand, public policy dictates that an employer should not have to insure
all persons who do any kind of work for him, when such work is irregular, novel or
unpredictable. If this were not so, most employers would be surprised to find the law requires
them to insure occasional work by, for example, carpet cleaners, painters, and furnace repairmen
under worker's compensation. Obviously, Robinson, the direct employer in this case, should
have had worker's compensation coverage and he is being held liable by the Industrial
Commission for not doing so. The Idaho Legislature clearly wanted to hold statutory employers
to the same level of responsibility to provide worker's compensation coverage as would direct
employers. (See Idaho Code §72-216). But there is no indication the Legislature wanted to hold
statutory employers to an even higher standard than direct employers. If employment by a direct
employer is determined to be casual in nature and exempt from coverage, statutory employment
should equally be considered exempt from coverage. Again, it is not the employee that is casual,
but the employment which should be considered in making the determination of an exemption.

20

Since the nature of Stringer's employment, i.e. working on a temporary remodeling project for
nine days, was found to be casual in nature, then even if he is a statutory employee, because the
nature of the employment has not changed, it logically follows that Griffeth would not be liable
for compensation as a statutory employer.
If Griffeth had been hiring people to do remodeling jobs as part of his usual trade or

business, he would be liable for compensation to an employee of his subcontractor under the
statutory employer rule ifthe subcontractor did not have worker's compensation coverage. The
argument by Stringer that the exception for casual employment will overcome the statutory
employer rule is simply unfounded. The sky will not fall because casual employment is
maintained as an exemption by rule oflaw whether the employment be direct or statutory. The
employer must still carry the burden of proof for the stringent elements of casual employment
before the exemption comes into play. The findings of the Industrial Commission reveal that
Griffeth has met that burden.

CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission has made its findings with regards to the facts which have
given rise to its conclusion that the employment of Stringer was casual in nature and therefore
exempt from worker's compensation coverage. A review of those decisions in which casual
employment has been invoked shows a consistent precedent which fits into the fact pattern of this
claim. Certainly Stringer's employment was occasional, uncertain, and irregular. No one could
anticipate that a remodeling job for the Teton Physical Therapy Building would be likely to re-
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occur or become necessary in the foreseeable future. The employment was incidental and not
part of the usual trade or business of the employer, a physical therapist.

Idaho Code §72-216(1) states that if an employer would have been liable for
compensation had he directly employed the injured party, he would be liable as a statutory
employer. If he is not liable as a direct employer, then he cannot be held liable as a statutory
employer. As determined by the Industrial Commission, Griffeth would not have been liable for
compensation as a direct employer and therefore he is not liable as a statutory employer. The
casual employment exemption applies in both instances.
The decision by the Industrial Commission is well thought out. There are numerous
factual findings which should remain undisturbed and the legal conclusions are soundly based
upon statutory and case law precedent which have not been challenged.
It is respectfully requested that the Court affirm the decision by the Industrial
Commission.
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